Missouri Law Review
Volume 64
Issue 2 Spring 1999

Article 4

Spring 1999

Narrow Application of Buckley v. Valeo: Is Campaign Finance
Reform Possible in the Eighth Circuit, The
Matthew S. Criscimagna

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Matthew S. Criscimagna, Narrow Application of Buckley v. Valeo: Is Campaign Finance Reform Possible in
the Eighth Circuit, The, 64 MO. L. REV. (1999)
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/4

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri School of Law
Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Missouri Law Review by an authorized editor of
University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
bassettcw@missouri.edu.

Criscimagna: Criscimagna: Narrow Application of Buckley v. Valeo:

Notes
The Narrow Application of Buckley v. Valeo:
Is Campaign Finance Reform Possible in the

Eighth Circuit?
Russell v. Burris'

I. INTRODUCTION
Federal campaign finance reform has been a hot topic as of late, from the
recent debates of the McCain-Feingold bill in Congress to the investigation of
alleged violations in connection with the 1996 presidential election. The issue
of campaign finance reform is of equal importance on the state level. A majority
1990.2
of states have been reforming their campaign finance laws since
However, these reforms have not avoided constitutional challenges.
The Eighth Circuit has been particularly harsh when reviewing challenges
to state campaign finance reform. This has led to a limited number of
alternatives for the states to employ when reforming their campaign finance
laws.' The Eighth Circuit's decision in Russell v. Burris is another decision
which solidifies the Eighth Circuit's stance on campaign finance reform and
greatly reduces the available options for states.

II. FACTS AND HOLDING
This dispute arose after Initiated Act I ("Act I" or "the Act"), which
amended the existing Arkansas campaign contribution laws, was passed by
Arkansas voters on November 5, 1996.6 Prior to the Act, individuals,
corporations, unions, political action committees (PACs), and other groups were
permitted to contribute a maximum of one thousand dollars to a candidate per
7
"Act I made substantial changes to Arkansas' campaign contribution
election.
8
law.

1. 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).
& DANIEL R. ORTIZ, Recent Innovations, in CAMPAIGN
FINANCE REFORM: A SOURCEBOOK 337, 337 (Anthony Corrado et al. eds., 1997)
[hereinafter CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK].
3. See id.
4. See infra text accompanying notes 89-102.
5. See CORRADO & ORTIZ, supra note 2, at 337.
6. Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (E.D. Ark. 1997), affid in part,rev'd
in part, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).
7. Id. (citing ARK. CODE ANN. §§ 7-6-201(1), -203(a) (Michie Supp. 1997)).
8. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1214.
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Under Act I, a "statewide candidate" was not permitted to accept a
contribution in excess of three hundred dollars per election from any person.9
All other offices, including Arkansas Supreme Court Justices and appellate
judges, were limited to accepting contributions of no more than one hundred
dollars per election -from any person. 0 The Act also created a "small donor"
PAC" that was allowed to contribute up to twenty-five hundred dollars to a
candidate per election. 2 PACs, by definition, are "persons" under the Act and
therefore subject to the one hundred dollar and three hundred dollar contribution
limits. 3 The Act also limited the total annual contributions a person could make
to an independent expenditure committee to five hundred dollars. 4 Finally, Act

9. Id. The amended statute provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any candidate for the office of Governor, Lieutenant
Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of State, Auditor of State, Attorney
Oeneral, and Commissioner of State Lands, or for any person acting on the
candidate's behalf, to accept campaign contributions in excess of three
hundred dollars ($300) per election from any person.
Id. at 1214-15 n.2 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-203(a)(2) (Michie Supp. 1997)).

10. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1215. The amended statute provided:
It shall be unlawful for any candidate for any public office, except the office
of Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Secretary of State, Treasurer of State,
Auditor of State, Attorney General, and Commissioner of State Lands, or for
any person acting on the candidate's behalf, to accept campaign contributions
in excess of one hundred dollars ($100) per election from any person.
Id. at 1215 n.3 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-203(a)(1) (Michie Supp. 1997)).
11. Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1215 (E.D. Ark. 1997), aff'd in part,
rev'd inpart, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999). The
amended statute provided:
A "small donor political action committee" means any person who: (A)
Receives contributions from one or more individuals in order to make
contributions to candidates; (B) Does not accept any contribution or
cumulative contributions in excess of twenty-five dollars ($25) from any
individual in any calender year, and (C) Is registered pursuant to Arkansas
Code 7-6-215 prior to making contributions to candidates. "Small donor
political action committee" shall not include an organized political party, the
candidate's own committee, or an exploratory committee.
Id. at 1215 n.5 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-201(12) (Michie Supp. 1997)).

12. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1214. The amended statute provided: However, an
organized political party as defined in Arkansas Code 7-1-101(1) and a small donor
political action committee may contribute up to two thousand five hundred dollars
($2500) to each candidate per election. Id. at 1215 n.4 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6203(d) (Michie Supp. 1997)).
13. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1215 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-201(1) (Michie
Supp. 1997)).
14. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1215. The amended statute provided: "An
Independent expenditure committee may not accept any contribution or cumulative
contributions in excess of five hundred dollars ($500) in value from any person in any
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/4
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I conferred the right to "municipalities, counties, and townships"
to set lower
5
campaign contribution limits than those set by the Act.1
This cause of action was brought by three individuals (Kent Ingram,
William R. Austin, and Ron Russell) and a registered Arkansas PAC (Associate
Industries of Arkansas Political Action Committee).' 6 Ingram was a repeated
campaign contributor, businessman, former senator, and an officer of the State
Chamber PAC who wanted to continue making campaign contributions at the
former limits.'7 Austin was a businessman and officer of Associate Industries
of Arkansas Political Action Committee (AIAPAC) who was interested in

making contributions in excess of the Act I limits. 8 Russell was the Executive
Vice-President of the Arkansas Chamber of Commerce, a former mayor, and an
officer of both the State Chamber PAC and AIAPAC who desired to contribute
amounts in excess of the Act I limits. 9 AIAPAC was an approved PAC that

wanted to be subject to the same limitations as a small donor PAC so that it
could make contributions of twenty-five hundred dollars. 20 The AIAPAC and
State Chamber PAC were private, non-profit organizations that worked together
"to continually enhance the economic climate in Arkansas."'"
The defendants were the chairman of the Arkansas Ethics Commission
(AEC), along with the other members of AEC, sued in their official capacities.'
AEC was the agency charged with the administration of Arkansas's campaign
finance laws.' Citizens for Clean Government (Citizens), a coalition of
organizations
that was the major proponent of Act I, intervened as a defendant
24
in the suit.
calender year." Id. at 1215-16 n.7 (quoting ARK. CODEANN. § 7-6-203(k) (Michie Supp.
1997)).
15. Russell, 978 F. Supp. at 1216. The amended statute provided:
Authority of Local Jurisdictions Municipalities, counties and townships shall

have the authority to establish: reasonable limitations on the time periods
candidates for local office shall be allowed to solicit contributions; limits on
contributions to local candidates at amounts lower than those set by state law;
and voluntary campaign expenditure limits for candidates seeking election to
their respective governing bodies.

Id. at 1216 n.9 (quoting ARK. CODE ANN. § 7-6-224 (Michie Supp. 1997)).
16. Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1216 (E.D. Ark. 1997), aff'd in part,
rev'd in part, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).

17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
21. About the Arkansas State Chamber of Commerce/Associated Industries of
Arkansas (visited Oct. 2, 1998) <http://www.aiea.ualr.edu/dina/statcham/about.html>.
22. Russell v. Burnis, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1214 (E.D. Ark. 1997), aff'd inpart,revd
in part, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).
23. Id.
24. Id.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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The plaintiffs asserted that Act I violated their First Amendment rights to
freedom of political speech and freedom of association by limiting campaign
contributions to candidates to one hundred dollars and three hundred dollars, by
authorizing local jurisdictions to set lower limits, and by limiting contributions
to independent expenditure committees to five hundred dollars.' The plaintiffs
also challenged Arkansas's annual two hundred dollar per individual
contribution limit to PACs.26 Finally, the plaintiffs alleged a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, arguing that restricting PACs to a contribution of one
hundred dollars or three hundred dollars while allowing small donor PACs to
contribute twenty-five hundred dollars denied them equal protection.
The district court first held that the plaintiffs lacked stariding to challenge
the Act's provision limiting contributions to independent expenditure
committees because the plaintiffs could not produce evidence that they had ever
contributed to an independent expenditure committee.28 The court also held that
the plaintiff's mere desire to contribute to an independent expenditure committee
in the future was not sufficient to create standing. 29 The court then found that the
plaintiffs' challenge to the Act's provision empowering local jurisdictions to set
their own contribution limits was not ripe for adjudication." The district court
then proceeded to consider the plaintiffs' remaining claims.3
In considering the plaintiffs' attack on Act I, the court applied the test set

forth inBuckley v. Valeo32 and subsequently modified by the Eighth Circuit in
Carver v. Nixon.33 In applying the test, the court declared the three hundred
dollar contribution limit to statewide candidates unconstitutional,34 upheld the
Act's one hundred dollar contribution limit to non-statewide offices,3" upheld the

25. Id.
26. Id. This limit was not set forth by Act I but was established by a ballot

initiative in 1990. Id. at 1216-17.
27. Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1217 (E.D. Ark. 1997), aff'd in part,

rev'd inpart,146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1218 (explaining no local jurisdiction had yet set a lower contribution
level).

31. Id. at 1218-28.
32. 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
33. 72 F.3d 633, 635-44 (8th Cir. 1995).
34. Russell v. Burris, 978 F. Supp. 1211, 1223 (E.D. Ark. 1997), affd in part,
rev'd in part, 146 F.3d 563 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999). The

court found the previous limit of $1,000 was not large enough to give Arkansas a
"compelling interest necessary to justify further limiting contributions in the 'statewide
races."' Id. at 1222. The court included the offices of Supreme Court Justice and Court
of Appeals Judge in the category of statewide offices. Id.
35. Id. at 1223-24. However, the court found that the $100 limit was
unconstitutional as to the offices of Arkansas Supreme Court Justice and Arkansas Court
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/4
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two hundred dollar pre-Act I limit for PACs, 36 and held that the Act's twenty-

five hundred dollar contribution for "small donor" PACs did not violate the
Fourteenth Amendment.37 Finally, the court held that the unconstitutional
provisions were severable and that the remaining provisions of Act I remained
intact.38 All parties appealed the decision of the district court.39
The Eighth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the
district court. 40 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's finding that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the limitation on contributions to
independent expenditure committees. 4' The Eighth Circuit also affirmed the
district court's decision that the three hundred dollar limit for statewide
candidates was unconstitutional,42 but reversed the district court by holding that
the one hundred dollar limit for non-statewide candidates was unconstitutional
as well.43 The Eighth Circuit also reversed the district court by finding that the
two hundred dollar pre-Act I limit for PACs was unconstitutional, 4 and by
holding that the provision allowing small donor PACs to contribute twenty-five
hundred dollars while limiting other PACs to two hundred dollars was
unconstitutional. 45 Finally, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's
decision holding that the Act's provision empowering local jurisdictions to set
their own campaign contribution limits was not ripe for adjudication.46

of Appeals Judge because these officials are elected in statewide elections and are
"subject to more stringent restrictions in solicitation than other candidates." Id. at 1224.
36. Id. at 1225. The court, while sympathetic to the PACs, held that the limit was
constitutional, taking into consideration the negligible impact the $200 limit has had in
allowing PACs to "amassfl the resources necessary for effective advocacy." Id. at 1225
(quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 21 (1976)).
37. Id. at 1227. The court compared the various restrictions placed on both
approved PACs and "small donor" PACs and found that approved PACs were not
significantly more burdened than "small donor" PACs. Id. However, the court noted
that even had approved PACs been more burdened, the State would be justified by a
"compelling interest in avoiding actual or apparent corruption." Id.
38. Id. at 1229.
39. See Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 1998), aff'g in part,rev'gin
part, 978 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).
40. Id. at 573.
41. Id. at 567.
42. Id. at 571 (citing Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 641-42 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)).
43. Id.
44. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir. 1998), aff'g in part,rev'd in part,

978 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1997), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).
45. Id. at 572.
46. Id. at 573.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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IL LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Introduction
In 1971, amid the aftermath of the Watergate scandal,47 Congress enacted
the Federal Election Campaign Act (FECA).4" FECA limited contributions to
candidates for federal office by an individual or group to one thousand dollars,
by a PAC to five thousand dollars, and by a political party to twenty-five
thousand dollars. 49 FECA also limited campaign expenditures by individuals
and groups to one thousand dollars and limited expenditures by candidate from
personal funds to various amounts depending on the office sought." Finally,
FECA required record-keeping and filing of campaign finance information and
established the Federal Election Commission. FECA was supplemented in
1974 by amendments to the Internal Revenue Code which provided public
funding for certain presidential candidates. 2 FECA was challenged in 1975 as
violating the First Amendment. 3 The challengers appealed the case to the
Supreme Court in 1975, and the Court issued its opinion regarding FECA in
Buckley v. Valeo in 1976.s 4

B. Buckley v. Valeo 55 andIts Progeny
In 1976, the Supreme Court delivered a lengthy opinion in Buckley v.
Valeo, 6 upholding some provisions of FECA while striking down others. The
Supreme Court immediately distinguished between campaign contributions and

campaign expenditures. 57 Regarding expenditures, the Court stated that "a
restriction on the amount of money a person or group can spend on political
communication during a campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression

47. See Lisa Gordon, Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v.
Federal Election Commission: A Court Divided - One Opinion Properly Subjects
CampaignFinanceJurisprudenceto a Reality Check, 81 MINN. L. REV. 1565, 1569 n.23
(1997).
48. Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (1972) (codified as amended in scattered
sections of 2 U.S.C., 18 U.S.C., and 47 U.S.C. (1994)).
49. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976).
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2.
52. Id.
53. See Buckley v. Valeo, 387 F. Supp. 135, 137 (D.D.C. 1975).
54. See infra notes 55-84 and accompanying text.
55. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
56. Id.
57. Id. at 19-21.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/4
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by restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration, and
the size of the audience reached.""8 In contrast, the Court found that:
a limitation upon the amount that any one person or group may
contribute entails only a marginal restriction upon the contributor's
ability to engage in free communication. A contribution serves as a
general expression of support for a candidate and his views but does
not communicate the underlying basis for the support. The quantity
of communication by the contributor does not increase perceptibly
with the size of his contribution, since the expression rests solely on
the undifferentiated, symbolic act of contributing. At most, the size of
the contribution provides a very rough index of the intensity of the
contributor's support for the candidate. A limitation on the amount of

money a person may give to candidate or campaign organization thus
involves little direct restraint on his political communication, for it
permits the symbolic expression of support evidenced by a
contribution but does not in any way infringe the contributor's
freedom to discuss candidates and issues.5 9
However, while the Court distinguished the two, it recognized
"fundamental First Amendment interests" in both campaign expenditures and
campaign contributions." Since the restrictions imposed by FECA implicated
First Amendment freedoms of speech and association, the Court employed the
closest scrutiny.6' In applying this strict scrutiny standard, the Court announced
the following two-pronged test: FECA's limitations on First Amendment speech
and associational rights may be upheld only if the government can demonstrate
(1) a sufficiently important interest, and (2) that the means to protect that interest
have been "closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of associational
freedoms."62
The primary interest of Congress in limiting campaign contributions was
"the prevention of corruption and the appearance of corruption spawned by the
real or imagined coercive influence of large financial contributions on
candidates' positions and on their actions if elected to office." 6 The Court found
this interest to be a legitimate justification for limiting contributions to one
thousand dollars under FECA.' The Court noted that candidates depend on
58. Id. at 19.
59. Id. at 20-21.
60. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 23 (1976).

61. Id. at 25 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449,460-61
(1958)).
62. Id. at 25 (quoting Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 488 (1975)); NAACP v.
Button, 371 U.S. 415, 431 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)).
63. Id. at 25.
64. Id. at 25-26.
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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contributions from others to run their campaigns and that "the integrity of our
system of representative democracy is undermined" by quid pro quo
contributions. 6' The Court stated that while it is very difficult to verify corrupt
practices, "the deeply disturbing examples surfacing after the 1972 election
demonstrate that the problem is not an illusory one., 66 The Court went on to
observe that the effect of the appearance of corruption on the public was "of
almost equal concern as the danger of actual quid pro quo arrangements. 67
After determining that the first prong of the test had been met, the Court
proceeded to determine whether the limitation on contributions had been
narrowly tailored to effectuate the government's interests.68 The Supreme Court
found that the one thousand dollar limitation on contributions focused
specifically on the issue of large campaign contributions and did not significantly
impair the potential for meaningful political debate. 69 The Court stated that
"[FECA's] contribution limitations in themselves do not undermine to any
material degree the potential for robust and effective discussion of candidates
and campaign issues by individual citizens, associations, the institutional press,
candidates, and political parties."7
While it was argued that the limits were unrealistically low, the Court noted
that it had "no scalpel to probe, whether, say, a $2,000 ceiling might not serve
as well as $1,000."7' The Court further noted that "such distinctions in degree
become significant only when they can be said to amount to differences in
kind."' Therefore, the Supreme Court upheld the one thousand dollar limitation
on contributions by individuals and subsequently upheld the contribution
limitations on PACs, the limitations on volunteers' incidental expenses, and the
twenty-five thousand dollar limitation on total annual contributions by
individuals.'
The Court next considered the limitations on campaign expenditures.74 The
Court deemed limitations upon expenditures to be "direct and substantial
restraints on the quantity ofpolitical speech."75 Because of the greater restraints
on freedom of speech and association imposed by expenditure limitations, the
Court found that the governmental interest in preventing corruption and the
appearance of corruption was insufficient to justify the limitations. 76 The
65. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,26-27 (1976).
66. Id. at 27.
67. Id.
68. Id. at 27-29.
69. Id. at 28-29.
70. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1,29-30 (1976).
71. Id. at 30 (quoting Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821 (D.C. Cir. 1975)).
72. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 30.
73. Id. at 30, 35-36, 37, 38.
74. Id. at 39-60.
75. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39 (1976).
76. Id. at 45.

https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/4
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Government argued that there was a secondary governmental interest in limiting
expenditures: to equalize the ability of different individuals to influence the
outcome of elections.77 The Court rejected this argument as well, finding that
"the concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our
society in order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the
First Amendment."78 Because the Court could find no compelling governmental
interests sufficient to justify the limitations on expenditures, it struck down all
such limitations.79
The Supreme Court in Buckley determined the First Amendment gauge of
campaign finance regulation, requiring the government to establish a compelling
interest in order to limit contributions and expenditures.80 However, the Court
did not require the Government to show actual harm, but allowed the
Government to simply theorize the harm." While the Court found the interest
of preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption to be compelling for
limiting contributions, 8 2 the Court did not find that interest to be sufficient for
limiting expenditures.8 3 The Court also required the Government to show that
the means employed were narrowly tailored to meet those interests. However,
the Court could not invalidate limitations as being too low unless those
limitations amounted to a difference in kind, as opposed to a difference in
degree. 4
Since Buckley, several Supreme Court cases have revisited the issue of
campaign finance reform.8 5 However, the 1985 Supreme Court case of FECv.

77. Id. at48.
78. Id. at 48-49.
79. Id. at 51, 54, 58.
80. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 25 (1976).
81. D. Bruce La Pierre, Raising a New FirstAmendment Hurdlefor Campaign
Finance "Reform," 76 WASH. U. L.Q. 217, 223 (1998).
82. See supranotes 56-60 and accompanying text
83. See supra notes 67-72 and accompanying text.
84. See supra notes 64-66 and accompanying text.
85. Colorado Republican Fed. Campaign Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518
U.S. 604, 604 (1996) (holding in a plurality opinion that a federal regulation limiting
political party spending on behalf of or against candidates was unconstitutional); Austin

v. Michigan State Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652 (1990) (holding that a Michigan
law prohibiting corporations from making direct expenditures in support of state
candidates was constitutional); Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens For
Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238 (1986) (holding that restrictions to "ideological," non-economic
corporations violated the First Amendment); Federal Election Comm'n v. National
Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480 (1985) (striking down a restriction

on independent "political committee" expenditures as unconstitutional); Citizens Against
Rent Control v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290 (1981) (striking down a $250 limit on
contributions to committees formed to support or oppose ballot measures); California
Med. Ass'n v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182 (1981) (a plurality opinion
upholding an individual contribution limit by an individual to a PAC to $5,000 per year);
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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NCPAC first revisited and clarified the two-pronged test set out in Buckley.86 In
that case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed Buckley and held not only that the
governmental interest in preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption
was a compelling interest for restricting campaign finances, but also that it was
the only compelling interest.8 7 The modification of the test set forth in Buckley
served to place more stringent conditions on the government's ability to regulate
campaign finance because the government may now set forth just one interest as
a reason for regulating campaign finance. Further narrow interpretations of the
Buckley test appear in the decisions of the Eighth Circuit.88
C. Eighth CircuitDecisionsFurtherRestrictingBuckley
The Eighth Circuit has handed down several decisions, relying on Buckley,
that make the test for restricting campaign contributions even more stringent.
Two such major decisions from the Eighth Circuit that created more obstacles
for states to clea*r in enacting campaign finance regulations are Day v. Holohan"
and Carverv. Nixon.9"
In Day, the Eighth Circuit struck down two Minnesota statutory provisions
that limited both individual campaign expenditures and contributions to political
committees to one hundred dollars. 9' The Eighth Circuit applied the Buckley test
in making this determination, stating that the statute may be upheld "if the state
can show that [the statute] is narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state
interest."92 The court followed Buckley and NCPAC to state that the only
compelling governmental interest in limiting campaign contributions is
preventing corruption or the appearance of corruption.93 The court found that
Minnesota met this prong of the test and proceeded to determine whether the
second prong of the test had been met.94 In applying the second prong of the
Buckley test, the court imposed a more stringent standard. 95 The court
determined that the limit was not narrowly tailored to achieve the state's interest
in preventing corruption and the appearance of corruption. 96 The Eighth Circuit
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978) (holding that a state cannot limit
expenditures by corporations in connection with a referendum).
86. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm.,
470 U.S. 480 (1985).
87. Id. at 496-97.
88. See infranotes 89-102 and accompanying text.
89. 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994).
90. 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995).
91. See Day, 34 F.3d at 1366.
92. Id. at 1361.
93. Id. at 1365.
94. See Day v. Holohan, 34 F.3d 1356, 1365 (8th Cir. 1994).
95. Id. at 1360-61, 1366.
96. Id. at 1366.
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol64/iss2/4
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compared the Minnesota limit to the one thousand dollar limit upheld in
Buckley.97 In this comparison, the Eighth Circuit adjusted the Minnesota limit
for inflation to find that a limit of one hundred dollars in 1976 would have
amounted to $40.60 in 1994, which was approximately four percent of the limit
approved in Buckley. 98 The court found that this limit was "too low to allow
meaningful participation in protected political speech and association, and thus
[was] not narrowly tailored to serve the state's legitimate interest in protecting
the integrity of the political system." 99 Therefore, by adjusting Minnesota's limit
for inflation, the court imposed a more stringent application of the Buckley test.
After Day, by adjusting a challenged statutory limit for inflation and comparing
it to the limits set forth in Buckley, the Eighth Circuit made it much easier for a
court to declare contribution limits unconstitutional.
In Carver, the Eighth Circuit supplemented Buckley with an even more
stringent application of the test.1°° While NCPAC stated that the only compelling
governmental interest for restricting campaign contributions was to prevent
corruption and the appearance of corruption, a state only needed to speculate the
harms, not prove that they existed.101 In Carver,however, the court pronounced
that a government must do more than postulate a compelling interest, but rather
"must demonstrate that the recited harms are real .... and that the regulation will
in fact alleviate these harms in a direct and material way."'" This creates yet
another impediment to states enacting campaign finance regulations. AfterDay
and Carver,a state must prove a compelling state interest and that the means are
narrowly tailored to address those interests. A state must also take into
consideration an adjustment for inflation in determining whether the means are
narrowly tailored.
IV. INSTANT DECISION
A. Standing

In Russell v. Burris, 3 the Eighth Circuit first considered whether the
plaintiffs had standing to bring the suit. 1°4 The trial court determined that the
plaintiffs had standing to bring suit on all challenged provisions of the Act
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,518 U.S. 1033
(1996).
101. See supra text accompanying note 81.
102. Carver, 72 F.3d at 638 (citing United States v. National Treasury Employees
Union, 513 U.S. 454, 475 (1995)) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Federal
Communications Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622, 664 (1994)).

103. 146 F.3d 563, 566-67 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).
104. Id.
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except for the provision regarding independent expenditure committees. The

court limited its review to that provision." The court applied the test set forth

in Boyle v. Anderson"06 to find that the plaintiffs lacked standing to challenge the
provisions concerning independent expenditure committees.0 7 The plaintiffs
failed to meet the first element of the test, which required the plaintiffs to show
that they "suffered an 'injury in fact,' ... [that] must be concrete, particularized,
and either actual or imminent."'0 5 The plaintiffs could not produce any evidence
that they had contributed to an independent expenditure committee in the past
or that, but for the limitations imposed by Act I, they would contribute to one in
the future. The court therefore held that the plaintiffs lacked standing as to the
provision concerning independent expenditure committees. 9

B. Standardof Review
The Eighth Circuit then considered the standard of review for the
challenged provisions of the Act." 0 The court stated that because the
government may only limit free speech to the degree necessary to prevent
specific harms, any attempts to do so are subject to strict scrutiny."' They
applied the two-pronged Buckley test as modified in Carver,observing that the
state must establish a "compelling interest and means12closely drawn to avoid
'
unnecessary abridgement of associational freedoms." "

105. Id. at 566.

106. 68 F.3d 1093 (8th Cir. 1995). A plaintiff must show that (1) they have
suffered a concrete injury, (2) the injury was caused by the challenged conduct, and (3)
redress for the injury is likely. Id. at 1100-01.
107. Russell, 146 F.3d at 566-67.

108. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 566 (8th Cir. 1998) (quoting Boyle, 68 F.3d
at 1100-01), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999).
109. Id. at 567.
110. Id. at 567-68.

111. Id. at 567 (citing Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 636 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996)). Citizens, the intervenor-defendant, argued for a more
lenient standard because the Act included a public subsidy scheme, as well as limits on
contributions. Russell, 146 F.3d at 567. Citizens relied on Buckley for this proposition,
but the Court distinguished Buckley in that Buckley's public subsidy scheme was optional
whild Arkansas' Act I was not. Id. Citizens also argued for a more lenient standard due
to an opinion by three justices in ColoradoRepublican Federal Campaign Committee,

which employed a weighing test. Id. (citing Colorado Republican Federal Campaign
Comm. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 518 U.S. 604, 616, 618 (1996)). The Court found
this so called weighing test to be no more than a "restatement" of the Buckley test.
Russell, 146 F.3d at 568. Finally, Citizens argued for a more lenient standard in light of
a Supreme Court case which dealt with candidates who may appear on a party's ballot.
Id. Again the Court distinguished this case and refused to apply a more lenient standard.
Id.

112. Id. at 567 (citing Carver,72 F.2d at 636).
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The court recognized that the only compelling interest that a government
may have in restricting First Amendment speech is to prevent actual corruption
or the appearance of corruption." 3 Drawing from Carver,the court concluded
that a "state may abridge political speech in the form of campaign contributions
only to address the reality or perception of undue influence or corruption
attributable to large contributions.' ' 1 4 The court then proceeded to determine
whether the challenged provisions of Act I could withstand the scrutiny of this
test." 5
C. Individual Campaign ContributionLimits
The court first examined Act I's provisions limiting campaign contributions
from individuals to three hundred dollars for specified statewide offices and one
hundred dollars for all other statewide offices." 6 The court held that the state
failed to prove the existence of actual or perceived corruption due to large
campaign contributions and that the provisions were narrowly tailored to speak
to those issues." 7 The defendants failed to produce any evidence of actual
corruption due to large contributions; the court limited its inquiry to whether the
defendants proved that "a reasonable person could perceive, on the basis of the
evidence presented at trial, that. such contributions make for undue influence or
spawn corruption.' '
Although the defendants presented several different incidents in an attempt
to prove corruption, the court concluded they were insufficient to establish
perceived corruption." 9 The defendants first introduced evidence of a state
representative who received $2,700 in contributions from different entities in the
tobacco industry.' The court found that it was unreasonable to believe that
corruption was occurring because the contributions did not cause the
representative to change his vote and because a public official ordinarily votes
in a manner that pleases his contributors.' 2 ' The court further found that the

113. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir. 1998) (citing Federal Election
Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 496-97
(1985)), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 1040 (1999).
114. Id. at 568.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Russell v. Burnis, 146 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1040 (1999).
119. Id. at 569-70.
120. Id. at 569.
121. Id. The Court noted that all contributions could be banned if it were
reasonable to presume corruption when an official voted in ways to please his or her
contributors, except contributions from the official's adversaries which would result in
a "patent absurdity." Id.
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defendants' objections were unrelated to the size of the contributions received
by the representative because he did not receive any contributions in excess of
one thousand dollars." The court found that amount too low to produce a
perception of corruption. 23
The defendants next submitted evidence of a state representative who
24
received twenty-two thousand dollars from various sources at a fund-raiser.'
The representative received no more than one thousand dollars from any
contributor and there was no evidence that these were quid pro quo
arrangements.
The Eighth Circuit again found that the defendants were not
26
focusing on the size of the contributions but on the identity of the contributors.
The court concluded that this evidence was also insufficient to show that a
reasonable person would presume corruption due to large contributions." 7
Finally, the defendants offered evidence of contributions from "real estate
interests.' 28 Once again, the court found that the defendants were focusing on
the identity of the contributors and not on the size of the contributions. 9
Because of the foregoing reason and the fact that there was no evidence that any
members of the Little Rock city government received any contributions in excess
of the one thousand dollar limit nor any evidence that the members changed their
political behavior after the contributions, the court found this evidence
insufficient to conclude that there could be a reasonable perception of corruption
due to large contributions. 3 '
The Eighth Circuit then declared that, while the government could not
prove a compelling state interest, the Act's contribution limits were too low to
allow any substantial participation in free speech and association.' The court
compared the contribution limits in the Act with those in Buckley. 32 The court
cited Day,noting that inflation had greatly decreased the value of the dollar since
Buckley was decided in 1976.13 The Court determined that the dollar amount

122. This was the contribution limit prior to the enactment of Act I. See supra note
7 and accompanying text.
123. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.
1040 (1999).
124. Id. at 570.
125. Id.
126. Id. Some of these contributions came from lobbyists who lived outside of the
Representative's district. Id.
127. Id.
128. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 570 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.

1040 (1999).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 570-71.
133. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 570 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.
1040 (1999).
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upheld in Buckley would be worth about twenty-five hundred dollars today when
limits to determine
adjusted for inflation. 34 The court then analyzed the Act's 35
whether or not they differed in kind from Buckley's limits.
After adjusting for inflation, the court found the Act's one hundred dollar
and three hundred dollar contribution limits to be roughly four percent and
twelve percent of the Buckley limit, respectively.'36 The court noted that the
limits struck down in Day were four percent of the Buckley limit and those struck
137
down in Carverwere two percent to six percent of the limit upheld in Buckley.
The Eighth Circuit then held that the Act's contribution limits amounted to a
those upheld in Buckley and were therefore
difference in kind from
138
unconstitutionally low.
Finally, the court found that even if the state had a compelling interest to
prevent actual or perceived corruption, the Act's limits were not narrowly
tailored to serve those interests. 13 9 The court stated that Act I was both
free speech of all
underinclusive and overinclusive because it limited the
40
concerns.
defendants'
the
to
regard
without
contributors
D. PoliticalAction Committees
The next two provisions that the court examined related to PACs. The first
provision analyzed by the court was enacted in 1990, prior to the Act, and
prohibited individuals from contributing more than two hundred dollars per year
to a single PAC.141 The court again addressed the issue of whether the provision
those limits
was enacted with a compelling state interest in mind and whether
142
were narrowly tailored to serve the governmental interest.
In California Medical Association, the Supreme Court upheld a five
thousand dollar limitation on contributions by individuals to PACs. 43 The
Russell court found Arkansas' two hundred dollar limitation to be only five
percent of the five thousand dollar limitation, even without adjusting for
inflation.'" The court also found that the risk of quid pro quo arrangements was

134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 571.
137. Id.
138. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 571 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1040 (1999).

139. Id.
140. Id.
141. Id. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
142. Russell, 146 F.3d at 571.
143. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1040 (1999). See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
144. Russell, 146 F.3d at 571.
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not as significant in this context because a PAC holds no legislative power.145
The court then concluded that the two hundred dollar limit was too low because
it did not allow individuals to exercise their political rights to any meaningful
level and was therefore unconstitutional.'46
The secoid provision concerning PACs allowed small donor PACs to
contribute twenty-five hundred dollars to a candidate while a normal PAC could
only contribute one thousand dollars. 47 The defendants argued that the
difference in treatment between small donor PACs and normal PACs was
justified because small donor PACs could only accept contributions of twentyfive dollars, while normal PACs could accept larger contributions. 4 ' However,
the reasoning of the defendants was not accepted by the court because it
reaffirmed the proposition that the only compelling interest in limiting campaign
contributions is to prevent actual or perceived corruption.'4 9
The court asserted that a small donor PAC's ability to contribute twentyfive hundred dollars would produce a greater risk of quid pro quo agreements
than a one thousand dollar contribution from a normal PAC. 5 Given this
danger, the court found that this provision of the Act had not been narrowly
tailored to meet the state's compelling interest of preventing actual and perceived
corruption and was therefore unconstitutional.'
E. Reasonable Limitationson Contributionsand Expenditures
The final provision of the Act challenged by the plaintiffs was one that
permitted local governments to establish "'reasonable limitations"' on both
contributions and expenditures.'52 This provision did not set any specific limits
on contributions or expenditures but merely gave local governments the power
to set their own limits. 153 Because no local government had exercised this

145. Id.
146. Id.
147. Id. The limit for PAC contributions to candidates returned to $1,000 because
the Court struck down the $100 and $300 limitations. See supra text accompanying
notes 116-37.
148. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 572 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1040 (1999). Note that the $200 limit on contributions to PACs was found to be
unconstitutional. See supra text accompanying notes 138-43.
149. Russell, 146 F.3d at 572.
150. Id.

151. Id. The Court also justified striking down this provision as it violated equal
protection concerns because a normal PAC was more burdened than a "small donor"
PAC in that normal PACs could only contribute $1,000 to a candidate while a "small
donor" PAC could contribute $2,500. Id.

152. Id.
153. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 572 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.

1040 (1999).
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power, the court declined to assess its constitutionality, stating that the issue was
not ripe for adjudication.' s4
F. Severability
After invalidating several provisions of the Act, the court still had to
determine whether the remainder of Act I could stand or if it was invalidated in
its entirety. s As severability is a matter of state law, 1 6 the court looked to U.S.
Term Limits, Inc. v. Hill'5 7 and applied its two part test. 5 8 In applying the test,
a court must consider "(1) whether a single purpose is meant to be accomplished
by the act, and (2) whether the sections of the act are interrelated and dependent
upon each other."'5 9 In applying this test, the court determined that no single
purpose would be disrupted by its ruling and upheld the remaining provisions of
Act I.' 6
V. COMMENT

The impact of the Eighth Circuit's decision in Russell has had an immediate
effect on Missouri's campaign finance laws. In Shrink Missouri Government
PAC v. Adams,161 the Eastern District of Missouri upheld Missouri's contribution
limits of $1,075 dollars, $525 dollars, and $275 dollars. 62 The plaintiffs
appealed that decision, and following the Eighth Circuit's decision in Russell,
filed a motion seeking an injunction pending the appeal.'63
In an opinion granting the injunction, the Eighth Circuit essentially made
the invalidation of Missouri's contribution limits a foregone conclusion."a The

154. Id. at 573.
155. Id.
156. Id. (citing Leavitt v. Jane L., 518 U.S. 137, 139 (1996)).
157. 872 S.W.2d 349 (1994), affd sub nom. U.S. Term Limits, Inc., v. Thorton,
514 U.S. 779 (1995).
158. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 573 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.

1040 (1999).
159. Id. (citing U.S. Term Limits, Inc., 872 S.W.2d at 357).

160. Id.
161. 5 F. Supp. 2d 734 (E.D. Mo.), rev'd, 151 F.3d 763 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
grantedsub nom. Nixonv. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 119 S. Ct. 901 (1999).
162. Id. at 735. The challenged limits varied depending on the office sought. Id.
163. See ShrinkMo. Gov't, 151 F.3d at 763.
164. In addition to the decision granting the injunction, nothing in oral arguments,
which were held on August 21, 1998, made the appellees feel that the 8th Circuit would
decide any differently. Telephone Interview with James R. Layton, Assistant Attorney
General of Missouri (Sept. 30, 1998). Mr. Layton also stated that this was the first case
where he had written a petition for certiorari prior to a decision. Id. At that time, they
planned to either immediately file for an en banc hearing with the Missouri Supreme
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1999
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court looked to four factors to determine whether to grant the injunction: (1) the
probability of winning on the merits; (2) the chance that irreversible harm would
occur if no injunction was granted; (3) whether other parties would be injured
if an injunction was issued; and (4) whether the public would be injured by the
injunction. 165 In considering the first element of the test, the Eighth Circuit
stated that "in view of... prior case law" and the Russell decision, there was a
"strong likelihood that appellants will prevail when the case is heard on the
merits."'" The court was concerned that the state had not proven the existence
of actual or perceived corruption and that the limits were narrowly tailored to
meet those problems. 67 The court also found that the contribution limits were
"dramatically lower" than the one thousand dollar limit upheld in Buckley when
adjusted for inflation.' 6 The Eighth Circuit ordered that the appellees be
enjoined from enforcing the limits "pending a final decision by [the Eighth
Circuit] on the merits of this case."' 69 Despite the plea by the State of Missouri,
Supreme Court Justice Clarence Thomas refused to reinstate Missouri's
campaign contribution limits. 7 °
On November 30, 1998, the Eighth Circuit handed down its final decision
regarding the merits of the case.' The court struck down all of Missouri's
campaign contribution limits,'7 including the limit for statewide offices, despite
the fact that it is higherthan the federal limit. r Citing Russell, the court insisted
that the State "has the burden of showing that any limits it places on campaign
contributions are narrowly tailored to serve the State's compelling interest in
addressing proven 'real or perceived
undue influence or corruption attributable
' 74
to large political contributions.""q

Court or file directly with the United States Supreme Court. Id.
165. Shrink Mo. Gov't, 151 F.3d at 764 (citing Dataphase Sys., Inc. v. C L Sys.,
Inc., 640 F.2d 109 (8th Cir. 1981)).
166. Id.
167. Id.
168. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC v. Adams, 151 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1998), cert.
grantedsub nom. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 119 S.Ct. 901 (1999).
169. Id. at 765. The 8th Circuit briefly concluded that the remaining three factors
of the test had been met. Id. at 764-65.
170. Columbia Missouri Tribune Online, Thomas Won't Revive Missouri's
Campaign
Contribution
Limits
(published
Aug.
1,
1998)
<http://showmenews.com/archive/1998/Aug/0l/news/1998080118.html>.
171. ShrinkMo. Gov't, 151 F.3d at 763.
172. Id. at 523.

173. The Missouri limit for statewide offices is $1,075. See Shrink Mo. Gov't
PAC v. Adams, 151 F.3d 763, 764 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. granted sub nom. Nixon v.
Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 119 S.Ct. 901 (1999).
174. Id. (quoting Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 568 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 1040 (1999)).
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The court first considered whether the State had produced sufficient
evidence to prove its compelling interest in preventing actual or perceived
corruption75 The Eighth Circuit concluded that the State failed to "adduce
sufficient evidence even to show that there exists a genuine issue of material fact
regarding its alleged interest."176 The court then proceeded to observe that, even
if the State had proven a compelling interest, the State was not able to show that
the limits were "narrowly tailored to serve that interest."1 77 The court again
followed Russell and Day and adjusted the Missouri limits for7 inflation to show
that they differed in kind from the limits upheld in Buckley. 1
Given the imposing obstacles put in place by the Eighth Circuit in Day and
Carver and recently solidified in Russell and Shrink, the states will be hardpressed to enact campaign finance laws that will pass muster. One available
option, although unattractive for the states, is to set contribution limits high
enough to equal the Buckley limit, while taking inflation into account. This
would amount to contribution limits of approximately twenty-five hundred
dollars. 7 However, states would still need to prove the existence of actual
corruption or a perception of corruption. This was not difficult in 1972 with the
multi-million dollar contributions occurring in connection with the presidential
campaign,' but it is likely to prove more difficult in modem times. Short of
that, states will need to come up with creative and innovative ways to regulate
campaign contributions.
The Eighth Circuit has been stringent in applying the Buckley test to
campaign contribution limits. Its practice of adjusting contribution limits for
inflation has made it easy to find contribution limits unconstitutional.' In so
doing, the Eighth Circuit has called the federal limits into question. The Shrink
case is the only case in the nation that has challenged and struck down
contribution limits which equal the current federal limit." 2 As it currently
stands, the federal limit on contributions to a candidate is one thousand dollars."

175. Id. at 521-22.
176. Id. at 522. The State relied on an affidavit from a state senator in an attempt
to prove actual or perceived corruption. Id.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 523.

179. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 570 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S. Ct.
1040 (1999).
180. See Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633, 638 n.5 (8th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 518

U.S. 1033 (1996).
181. See generallyRussell, 146 F.3d at 563; Day v. Holahan, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th
Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995).
182. Jo Mannies, Judge Will Weigh Request to Temporarily Block Limits on
Campaign
Contributions
(published
Mar.
4,
1998)
<http:/archives.postnet.com/8625657f006b74fc/562e50b071e825be862565f600661d3
d/e6e6e8ae202e5b69862565be005a40e0?opendocument>.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 55-83; see also 2 U.S.C. § 608(b) (1994).
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According to the Eighth Circuit, the one thousand dollar limit upheld in Buckley
would be worth twenty-five hundred dollars today when adjusted for inflation.'"
Therefore, the Buckley limit today amounts to only approximately forty percent
of what it was in 1976.185
By striking down the Missouri campaign contribution limits, the Eighth
Circuit made the Shrink case a prime candidate for the U.S. Supreme Court to
issue a decision regarding campaign finance regulation. The fact that a limit
higher than the current federal limit was struck down makes the case particularly
appealing. On January 25, 1999, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear
the case.'86 However, it is unclear how the Supreme Court will decide the issue.
Although the Supreme Court granted certiorari to hear the Shrink case, it
declined the companion petition of Missouri legislator Joan Bray. 87 In her
petition, Bray asked the Court to go beyond the standard in Buckley and create
more stringent campaign finance regulations.'88 This may be an indication that
the Supreme Court is unwilling to reconsider its decision in Buckley.
Recent decisions by the Court also provide little indication of how it will
decide this case. In 1996, the Supreme Court reviewed Colorado Republican
FederalCampaign Committee, which concerned the issue of whether Congress
could limit independent expenditures by political parties.'89 In that case, the
Supreme Court found the regulation to be unconstitutional in a plurality opinion
which "raise[d] more issues than it answer[ed]."' ° The Justices split into four

The current statutes on federal campaign contributions contain no provisions adjusting
the limit for inflation.
184. Russell v. Burris, 146 F.3d 563, 570 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct.
1040 (1999).
185. Id. See also Craig M. Engle et al., Buckley Over Time: A New Problem With
Old ContributionLimits, 24 J. LEGIS. 207, 213 (1998) (stating that a $1,000 limit today
would have been worth approximately $320 in 1976).
186. Nixon v. Shrink Mo. Gov't PAC, 119 S.Ct. 901 (1999). Sde also Kenneth
P. Doyle & Kip Betz, Supreme Court to Review Missouri Case Testing Limits on
Campaign Contributions,BNA WASH. INSIDER, Jan. 26, 1999. The Arkansas Ethics
Commission also decided to appeal the Eighth Circuit's decision in Russell to the United
States Supreme Court. Elizabeth McFarland, CommissionAsks for Reversal ofRuling
on Campaign Donations, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GaZETIE (published Aug. 28, 1998)
<http:/www.ardemgaz.comlsearch%5Fprevious/elections.wycontrib28.html>.
The
Supreme Court denied both the appeals of Day, 34 F.3d 1356 (8th Cir. 1994), cert.
denied, 513 U.S. 1127 (1995), and Carver v. Nixon, 72 F.3d 633 (8th Cir. 1995), cert.
denied, 518 U.S. 1033 (1996).
187. See Doyle & Betz, supra note 186.
188. See Doyle & Betz, supranote 186.
189. See 518 U.S. 604 (1996).
190. Daniel R. Ortiz, The FirstAmendment at Work: ConstitutionalRestrictions
on CampaignFinanceRegulation, in CAMPAIGN FINANCE SOURCEBOOK, supra note 2,
at 65.
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factions and demonstrated a tremendous difference of opinion on campaign
finance issues. 91
In oral arguments in the case of Buckley v. American ConstitutionalLaw

Foundation,92 the Court demonstrated that it may follow the Eighth Circuit's
requirement that a state prove the existence of actual or perceived corruption.
During oral arguments, the Justices repeatedly asked the Colorado Attorney
General whether the state could provide evidence of fraud. 93 However, in its
decision, the Court did not employ a strict scrutiny standard in striking down
ballot-initiative restrictions. 94

While this case concerns ballot-initiative

restrictions, it shows that the Supreme Court is cognizant of a proof requirement
when restricting campaign-related activities.
The Court's position on the Eighth Circuit's practice of adjusting limits for
inflation is less clear. In Buckley v. Valeo, the Court upheld the contribution

limits despite the fact that the limits were not indexed for inflation.195 While

Congress has the power to amend FECA and raise these limits, it has yet to do
so.' 96 The 105th Congress attempted to reform campaign finance laws with the
McCain-Feingold bill, but this bill died in the Senate after getting through the
House.'97
The Supreme Court decided Buckley twenty-two years ago. Because of the
difficulty that campaign finance reform has had in Congress,'9" now is a good
time to settle the issue. By granting certiorari, the Supreme Court now has the
opportunity to redefine the standard for campaign finance regulations and end
the woes of campaign finance reform that have recently plagued our nation.

191. See id. at 65. Justices Breyer, O'Connor, and Souter applied a straightforward
Buckley analysis to find the law unconstitutional. Id. Justices Stevens and Ginsberg held
that Congress could limit the expenditures because Congress could presume that the
expenditures were coordinated with a candidate. Id. Justices Kennedy, Rehnquist, and
Scalia found that the First Amendment prohibited limitations on expenditures, without
differentiating between coordinated expenditures and independent expenditures. Id. at
65-66. Finally, Justice Thomas wrote a stirring opinion stating that the distinction
between contributions and expenditures should be abandoned, with regulations on both
being prohibited by the First Amendment. Id. at 66.
192. 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999). Oral arguments were heard on October 14, 1998. See
Tony Mauro, Supreme Court Questions Colorado's Ballot-Initiative Restrictions
1 9 9 8)
14,
Oct.
(published
<http://www.freedomforum.org/speech/1998/10/14buckley.asp>.
193. See Mauro, supra note 192.

194. See generallyBuckley, 119 S. Ct. 636 (1999)
195. See Engle et al., supra note 185, at 208.
196. See Engle et al., supra note 185, at 208-09.
197. FOR THERECORD: Role CallReport, WASH. POST, Sept. 17, 1998, at V08.
198. See CORRADO & ORTIZ, supra note 2, at 337 (commenting on George Bush's
veto of 1992 campaign finance legislation); supra text accompanying note 197
(commenting on McCain-Feingold bill dying in the Senate).
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VI. CONCLUSION

The Eighth Circuit's decisions in Russell, and more recently in Shrink,have
left no doubt as to where it stands on the issue of campaign finance reform. By
requiring that a state prove actual or perceived corruption and by adjusting
statutory limits for inflation, the Eighth Circuit has made it nearly impossible for
a state to enact any meaningful limits on campaign contributions. Currently,
Arkansas's campaign contribution limit for persons is one thousand dollars and
Missouri has no campaign contribution limits due to the Eighth Circuit's
stringent standards.
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